Jamal A. 2004. "The Ambiguities of Minorities Patriotism: Love for Homeland versus State among Palestinian Citizens of Israel. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics,10; 433-471
The State is defined as a Jewish state and is viewed by the Jewish majority as articulating the as articulating the right of self-determination of the Jewish people.
p.433
Charles Taylor, modern society exist if patriotism exist
Taylor C. 1996, Why Democracy Need Patriotism' in Cohen J. (ed) For the love of Country, Beacon Press, 119-121
Juergan Habermas 'constitutional patriotism'
Herbermas J. 1998, The inclusion of the other, MIT Press
According to this view, patriotism is both a rational loyalty and an emotional attachment to a common civil enterprise open and equal communicative action between individual.
p.435
Viewing patriotism as an attachment to the state alone eliminates a great deal of the social, cultural, and political components of human reality, especially when speaking of minorities that are not included in the ethnos of the state in which they live.
p.436
In cases in which one ethno-national group dominates the state and defines its public goods, minorities do not develop a patriotic attachment to the state; such is the case with the Tamil in Sri Lanka, the Basque in Spain and the Tibet people in Chine.
p.436
Arab patriotic attachment range from s simple romantic love of the homeland and the nation, to loyalty to the state, to counter-state patriotism that manifests itself in taking action countering state policies of control.
p.436
Link to place was an important component of political behavior for a Palestinian nation that found itself transformed virtually overnight from homeowners to strangers in their homeland.
p.437
The meaning of place has shifted with time from attachment to a particular locale of habitation to an abstract conception containing the whole land of Palestine. Hence, the emotional link to land became a central component of Palestinian existence, and maintaining this existence entailed a deep bond to places of residence and the surrounding landscape.
p.437
The Palestinian notion of preserving the connection to the land was strengthened once the voracious intentions of Israeli authorities became know – in part through the continuous invention of new methods for government inspectors to expropriate land from the Arab population and transfer it to various state institutions and private Jewish ownership.
p.438
While the Jewish population merged state and homeland, a clear dichotomy between the 'land' of the homeland and the state being established among Arabs in Israel.
p.442
Although people refrained from using the adjective 'Palestinian' – in consideration of the public mood that prevailed among the Jewish population at the time- these expression contained protest against the dominant Zionist discourse that appropriated the ground of the homeland and ascribed it to the Jewish nation.
p.443
Therefore, in light of the fact that the political, cultural, and economic leadership of the Palestinian nationalist movement did not remain within the physical territory of Israel, the local traditional leadership became the central focus.
p.445
This process was reflected in a complex political discourse, amounting to what sociologists in Israel have nicknamed 'Israelization'.
The best illustration of this process can be found in the celebrations of the Israeli day of independence that took place in Arab town and villages.
p.446
Azmi Bishara, 'The Arab Israeli: Observations on a Fractured Political Discourse' in Pimhas Ginnosaur and Avi Barali (eds), Zionism: A Polemic of Our Time (Sade Boker: The Ben-Gurion Legacy Center, 1996)
Sammy Smooha, Arabs and Jews in Israel (Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 1989); 'Political Stands or Arabs towards the Israeli Government, 1992-1996' in Aluf Hareven and As'as Ghanem (eds.), One look Back and one Forward: Equality and Integration (Jerusalem: Sikkuy, 1996), pp.57-8
In an endeavor to survive, Israeli Palestinians integrated components of their national and cultural identity with their new identity as citizens of the state. On one hand, they voted for the Mapai lists of Knesset candidates and hosted state leaders, including security officials, while on the other they listened to the speeches pf Egyptian President Jamel Abdel Nasser – whom they idolized – on Sawt al-Arab [Voice of the Arabs] radio broadcast from Cairo.
p.447
Arab communist leaders maintained national slogans that were redefined to accommodate to Arab presence in Israel. While utilizing Arab national imagery, they sought to establish clear borders between the new reality of the Arab citizens of Israel and the rest of the Arab world.
p.447
The communist Party that produced the Arab political and intellectual elite in Israel highlighted the cultural model it favored by introducing the political slogan of 'two states for two nations,' stressing the Green Line as the legitimate border for the State of Israel.
p.447
This change was the purest expression of acceptance of Israeli citizenship, in principle, as the legal-political framework in which Arabs in the future would struggle for their civil right as Israelis.
p.448
The Land Day, in memory of the bloody events that look place 30 March 1976 in protest of land confiscation policies, marked a very serious collective attempt by Israeli Palestinian to break the political framework presented to them by the Israeli authorities.
p.456
The politics of memory and the revival of the Palestinian heritage, while creating a bond between themselves and nationalist characteristics have come to characterize the collective behavior of the Palestinian population over the last 20 years.
p.456
The first phenomenon addressed is the visits of internally displaced persons (IDPs), know in Israel as the 'present absentees,' to their villages of origin, whose physical remain still today not far from where they currently live….The second phenomenon is the rehabilitation and remodeling of religious and historical sites which the state has controlled since the 1948 war…The third phenomenon is related to the status of the Arabic language in Israel and the battle to prevent its becoming an abandoned language in the Israeli public sphere, regardless of the fact that it is recognized as an official language of the state.
p.457
From the Palestinian point of view, the most tragic consequence of the 1948 War was the creation of the refugee problem. Refugees were not only those who were expelled or field to Arab regions outside the 'green line,' but also those whom the state law has depicted as 'present absentees' and whom international law calls IDPs. Those groups refers to those Palestinian Arabs living as refugees in neighboring villages or in distant locations inside the state, after they were expelled from or forced to leave their villages in the wake of the 1948 war or thereafter. They numbered somewhere between 30,000 and 50,000 immediately following the war.
p.457
The emergency regulations, which were instituted by the British Mandate in 1945, were utilized by the Israeli army to declare captured villages as military zones. This policy prevented refugees from returning after fighting subsided.
p.458
These lands [seize during the war and declared military zone] are put to Jewish use under the supervision of the Israel Land Authority (ILA) based on priorities set by the state to serve the interests of the Jewish majority. In most cases Jewish communities were established on Arab lands, with the legal owners living as IDPs nearby.
p.458
The link to the original place of residence and the aspiration to return to it have been an important component of Palestinian existence in Israel. If for Palestinian refugees currently residing in Arab countries this link over time became one of romance and memory, by contrast the IDPs saw, felt, and experienced the place of their original homes on a daily basis.
p.458
The purest expression for the centrality of place in the collective memory of Palestinians in Israel is the communal memory of the villages of Ikrit and Bir'am, from which the Israeli army ordered the resident to leave for security reasons in November 1848. The residents of the villages agreed to leave the villages based on the promise that they would be let back into the villages when the fighting was over, a promise that this day has not been fulfilled.
p.459
In addition, the Rights of Displaced Persons from 1948 – Citizens of the State of Israel,' a federation which includes more than 40 local associations established by persons displaced from various villages.
p.459
Despite the legal prohibition on entering the demolished villages, the IDPs have succeeded in making the visits into a patriotic march, which expresses a sharp protest and high degree of willingness to fight for the right to return to their roots.
p.460
Visit to the villages are held on three different dates: the day that the specific villages fell into Israeli hands in the War of 1948, on Land Day, 30 March or every years, and in the day the State of Israel declared its independence.
p.460
The marches express the deep ties to the site and great willingness to make sacrifices in order to return.
p.460
The attempt of the Jews to revive their heritage after a 2000-years absence serves as an inspiration for many national groups. The official archeological policy of the State of Israel turned every site in the country into a potential target fir the discovery of the Jewish past.
p.461
Similarly, since its establishment, the state's patronage policy in regard to all Muslim Waqf property (assets that belong to the Muslim congregation) has created growing distress among wide circles of the Palestinian population.
p.461
The Islamic Movement aspired to revive the religious awareness of the Muslim community living in Israel, and thus to widen the arena for the conflict with the state…The Islamic Movement is a nationalist political movement that constructed an inherent link between the Muslim faith and the national rights of the Palestinians, as expressed in religious sentiments that enhance a sense of belingingness and of man's link to his historical, social, cultural, and spiritual environment.
p.461
In May 1991, the process of deepening patriotic feelings among Muslim Palestinians in Israel was expressed and reinforced by the decision of the leader of the local Muslim councils inside the Green Line to establish a public association- Al-Aqsa Association- to protect Muslim holy sites and ensure that they be properly cared for: The Association declared that it 'closely watches [the holy sires] in order to care for, renovate and liberate them, and this is done via comprehensive and detailed research of all sites of the Wafq and holy locations. The Association detail how to reach these sites by means of creating a tourist map that specifices all the important location.
p.462
The [Al-Aqsa Association] initiated an extensive project in the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem's Old City that drew thousand of volunteers tot he site.
p.463
The Arabic language is perceived as the language of the enemy, and as a result ha always been ascribed an inferiour status in the Israeli public sphere.
p.463
The experience of Arabs in Israel led to the penetration of the Hebrew language into their daily lives. In informal discourses many Arabs, especially those from the younger generation, use Hebrew words while speaking Arabic.
p.464
In addition, one should ass that Israel has adopted a clear policy of Hebrewizing the public sphere. One example is the changing of the name od streets and sites from Arabic to Hebrew, as well as omitting Arabic from traffic signs in different areas of the country.
p.464
Arab legal and human rights organizations also turned to the courts in order to fight for Arabic's place in the public sphere.
p.464
The state, with its emphasis on its Jewish identity by means of Jewish and religious symbols and policies, has limited the possibility of Israeli patriotism among the Palestinian population.
p.465
This study has demonstrated that national minorities' can hardly develop patriotic feelings towards a state that does not offer them a citizenship model with which they can live. Any citizenship model that does not respect and incorporate the identity of the minorities renders civic patriotism among this minority void….it seems that states have to be loyal to their citizens as much as, if not more so than, they demand their citizens to be loyal toward them, if they want them to be patriotic. Patriotism is a contingent category that depends on the deep sense of respect, freedom, and equality. States that do not respect these needs and rights would be asking for the impossible if they were to demand genuine patriotism from disadvantaged citizens.
p.466